

## THE PERCEPTIVE MEANING IN VERBAL IRONY

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### Annotation

This article enlightens special features of irony by investigating two main ways including in echoic use and as a type of pretence in different speeches to translate for real purposes.

**Keywords:** echoic use of language, verbal irony, type of pretence, mocking

Irony has been investigated across various linguistic criteria and purpose was to answer the question of whether the classifications and general descriptions of irony, as true as they may seem, are possibly true enough for enquiries into areas such as translation and understanding the distinctive core perception. The generic and philosophical analysis criteria provided by the literary criticism, literary theory and pragmatic approaches hover around broad interpretive models of irony. These criteria are impractical for the investigation of irony for translation purposes. The perceptive translation of irony relies essentially on interpretation and creative reformulation, though. This is particularly the case when dealing with typologically distant languages, such as Uzbek and English, in a certain text-type. To be able to catch up with ironic texts there is a need for a more objective and applicable approach, which considers the identification of formal and rhetorical devices of ironic texts, hence a linguistic analysis that explains the communicative function of these devices at both the utterance and discourse structure levels. In this article two post-Gricean attempts to provide an explanatory account of verbal irony is considered by the perspectives of two languages abovementioned [Grice, H.P., 1989].

The first treats irony as an echoic use of language in which the speaker tacitly get the content of the discourse from an attributed utterance or thought.

The second treats irony as a type of pretence in which the speaker “pretends to be” to deliver a particular speech act, expecting the audience to see through the recognition of the mocking or critical attitude hidden in it.

The two approaches have sometimes been considered as empirically or theoretically difficult to distinguish, and several blended accounts including elements of both have been suggested. I will argue that the echoic and pretence accounts can be distinguished on both theoretical and empirical grounds, and that while echoic point is expressed to standard cases of verbal irony, pretence is not. However, the term irony has been applied to a very wide range of phenomena, not all of which can be explained in the same and standard way, and I will end by briefly mentioning some less central cases where varieties of pretence or simulation do indeed highlights the aspects of ironical effects.

Here are some typical examples of verbal irony:

*Rose (after a tough interview): That went perfect. (Roza (qiyin intervyudan so'ng)): Zo'r o'tdi.)*

*As I reached the bank at closing time, the bank clerk helpfully shut the door in my face. ( Bankka berkilish mahalda yetib borganimda, bank xodimi ishimni oson qilgandek eshikni yuzimga yopib qo'ydi)*

*Tim Henman is not the most charismatic tennis player in the world. (Tim Henman dunyoda yagona kelishgan tennis o'yinchisi emas)* [examples by Carston, R., 1996.]

The use of these utterances is not to state what they would be taken to claim if uttered actually (that the interview went well, the bank clerk behaved helpfully, and there are more charismatic tennis players than Tim Henman), but to draw attention to some distinction between a description of the world that the speaker is apparently arranging and the way (she wants to suggest) things actually were. A listener who does not recognize this will have misled, and a speaker who doubts the listener's ability to recognize it due to the background knowledge only may bring out extra clues (for instance, an ironical tone of voice, a wry and funny facial expression, exaggeration, as in (2), or a superlative, as in (3)).

To be able to understand simple forms of irony is normally present from around the age of 6, and is known to be impaired in autism and certain forms of right hemisphere damage [Capelli, C., Nakagawa, N., Madden, C., 1990.].

The main aspect of pragmatics is to describe this ability and thus explain how irony is understood. According to classical rhetoric, verbal irony is a trope, and tropes are utterances with figurative meanings which relate to their literal meanings in one of several standard ways. In metaphor, the figurative meaning is a simile or comparison based on the literal meaning; in irony proper, as in (1) and (2), it is the opposite of the literal meaning; and in ironical understatement, as in (3), it is a strengthening of the literal meaning. To turn them into an explanatory theory, we would need, first, a definition of figurative meaning, second, a method of deriving figurative meanings from their literal counterparts, and third, some rationale for the practice of substituting a figurative for a literal meaning. If figurative meanings are assigned by the grammar, we need an explicit mechanism for deriving them; if they are pragmatically inferred, we need an account of how the inference is triggered, what form it takes, and what types of outputs it yields.

In a few cases, what starts out as a creative use of irony may become fully lexicalized or grammaticalized. However, the interpretation of tropes in general is so highly context-dependent that it is most unlikely to be dealt with entirely in the grammar. Grice's brief discussion of tropes (Grice, 1967/1989: 34) was the first serious attempt to analyze them using pragmatic machinery independently needed for the analysis of ordinary literal utterances. As is well known, he treats irony as blatant violations of the first maxim of Quality ("Do not say what you believe to be false"), designed to trigger a related true implicature: in the case of metaphor, this would be a simile or comparison based on the literal meaning, in the case of irony it would be the contradictory or contrary of the literal meaning, and in the case of understatement it would be something stronger than the literal meaning. On this approach, the implicatures of (1)-(3) above would include (4a)-(4c):

- a. *That interview didn't go well. (Uchrashuv yaxshi o'tmagan )*
- b. *As I reached the bank at closing time, the bank clerk unhelpfully shut the door in my face. (Bank xodimi yordam bermagan)*
- c. *Tim Henman is far from being the most charismatic tennis player in the world. (Tim Henman kelishgan deb hisoblash uchun ancha yiroqda turadi chunki boshqa shu turdagi sportchilar ko'p)*

## References

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